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Bump certifi to 2026.10.19 for the eMudhra CA compromise - #41
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Drops the compromised eMudhra intermediates (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/) from the trust store requests uses when fetching release data from Nucleus.
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Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were recoverable from their certificates
(announced 2026-10-20, see https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/). Anyone with those keys
can impersonate any TLS host to a client that still trusts the chains.
This job runs every 15 minutes and fetches
nucleus.mozilla.org/rna/all-releases.jsonwithrequests, whose trust store is certifi. The pinned certifi (2025.11.12) still trusts the affected
chains, so this bumps it to 2026.10.19, which distrusts them. Compiled with
uv pip compile --upgrade-package certifi, so nothing else moved.The
python:3.11-slim-bookwormbase is pulled fresh on every run (docker build --pull) andpip 24.2+ uses the system trust store, so the image side picks up Debian's fixed
ca-certificateson its own once the upstream tag is rebuilt.Incident report: Mozilla Bugzilla #2083449. Companion PRs: mozilla/bedrock#17463,
mozmeao/springfield#1978, mozilla/nucleus#1246, mozmeao/basket#1827.