We take security seriously and work to keep this project up to date. If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately so we can investigate and ship a fix before the issue becomes public.

Please use one of the following private channels — do not open a public issue, pull request, or discussion for security concerns:

1. Preferred: open a private report via GitHub's Privately reporting a security vulnerability flow on this repository's Security tab.
2. Email: send the details to me@jaredwray.com. If the issue is urgent, include [SECURITY] in the subject line and we will respond as soon as possible.

When reporting, please include as much of the following as you can:

• A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept.
• The affected version(s) and platform.
• Any suggested remediation, if you have one.

We will acknowledge receipt, work with you on a coordinated disclosure timeline, and credit you in the advisory once a fix is published unless you ask to remain anonymous.

This repository follows the defense-in-depth hardening checklist; progress is tracked in DEFENSE_IN_DEPTH.md. Measures currently in place:

• All changes land through pull requests — direct pushes to main are blocked, and merging requires passing status checks (test, test-22, test-24, test-26, zizmor).
• Tags can only be created by repository admins; published GitHub Releases are immutable (assets and tags cannot be changed after publish).
• Workflow runs from outside collaborators always require maintainer approval, and only allowlisted GitHub Actions can run.
• CI workflows default to read-only contents: read permissions; generated output is never committed back from CI; every action is pinned to a full commit SHA; Socket Firewall (sfw) wraps pnpm install; workflows are security-linted with zizmor on every PR.
• npm publishing authenticates with OIDC trusted publishing configured stage-only on each published package (GitHub Actions → jaredwray/cacheable → workflow release.yml). There are no npm tokens in Actions secrets, and packages disallow tokens. CI packs tarballs and stages them with pnpm stage publish; Drydock reviews staged releases; a maintainer promotes with 2FA. The release job needs a passing Aikido scan-release.
• GitHub and npm maintainer accounts use phishing-resistant 2FA (passkeys / hardware keys).
• packageManager pins pnpm at 12.8.1. The lockfile is committed.
• pnpm installs dependencies with a 7-day cooldown, blocks lifecycle scripts by default, and sets trustPolicy to no-downgrade.
• There is no .github/dependabot.yml.
• Codespaces, Cursor Cloud Agents, and Claude Code on the web install through Aikido Safe Chain. Do not bypass the package-manager shims.
• The Dev Container image uses a digest pin. The tag is not latest.
• Socket reviews every dependency change. Aikido scans every build.
• .github/CODEOWNERS names owners for /.github/, /.vscode/, /.cursor/, /.devcontainer/, /.claude/, /.codex/, and /scripts/.