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cve CVE-2026-98260 commit-author Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> commit acb03d3 commit-source-sha 75aa08b commit-source linux-6.18.y upstream-diff | Context due to missing unrelated change: af7bb0d ("exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec") commit acb03d3 upstream. A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread's posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID. When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns that PID. pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL, but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand() takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it has nothing to undo. begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state normally stays invisible. But bprm->point_of_no_return is set before de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there. exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued, and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree. In short: the non-leader thread B the parent timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID) timer_settime() arm_timer() // the node is queued on B execve() de_thread(B) exchange_tids(B, leader) // B's PID now belongs to the leader release_task(leader) __exit_signal(leader) posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader) // cleans leader's queue, not B's __unhash_process(leader) // that PID has no task anymore exec_mmap() mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm) kill(B, SIGKILL) // -EINTR get_signal() do_exit() exit_itimers() posix_timer_delete() posix_cpu_timer_del() posix_timer_unhash_and_free() // freed while still queued wait4() release_task(B) posix_cpu_timers_exit(B) cleanup_timerqueue() timerqueue_del() // use-after-free Move the POSIX timer cleanup right after de_thread() before any of the later failure conditions brings the task into do_exit(). [ tglx: Move the cleanup right after de_thread() ] Fixes: 55e8c8e ("posix-cpu-timers: Store a reference to a pid not a task") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Tested-by: Kijo Park <red993688@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ao7Q8miiuLAPVnWv@v4bel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260911090541.627712075@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 75aa08b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
cve CVE-2026-80775 commit-author Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> commit bde0238 commit-source-sha 86d12b3 commit-source linux-6.18.y commit bde0238 upstream. futex_hash_allocate() allocates mm->futex.phash.ref without any locking. Commit d9b0532 ("futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()") moved the allocation here and assumed that the process has just a single thread at this point. Commit ee9dce4 ("futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc") widened need_futex_hash_allocate_default() to cover any CLONE_VM clone, but left out vfork because the parent is suspended and cannot race. That no longer holds once vfork is nested. If a vfork child calls vfork again and is then killed with SIGKILL, the parent is released from its vfork wait and runs concurrently with the grandchild in the same mm. Neither of them went through futex_hash_allocate_default(). When both call prctl(PR_FUTEX_HASH, PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS) at the same time, each one sees mm->futex.phash.ref as NULL and stores its own percpu counter. Only the last store survives. The counter stored first is no longer reachable from the mm, so the references on it are not seen by __futex_ref_atomic_end(). A private hash that still has references is then considered dead and freed, and a task that still holds one of its buckets writes into freed memory in futex_q_lock(). Store the counter once with cmpxchg() and let the loser free_percpu() its own. The initial reference has to be taken before the store, otherwise another task can install a private hash while the counter is still 0. Fixes: d9b0532 ("futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ansrpP4ImE1MaBY9@v4bel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 86d12b3) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
cve-pre CVE-2026-98256 commit-author Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> commit 63dffec A sigqueue belonging to a posix timer, which target is not a specific thread but a whole thread group, is preferrably targeted to the current task if it is part of that thread group. However nothing prevents a posix timer event from queueing such a sigqueue from a reaped yet running task. The interruptible code space between exit_notify() and the final call to schedule() is enough for posix_timer_fn() hrtimer to fire. If that happens while the current task is part of the thread group target, it is proposed to handle it but since its sighand pointer may have been cleared already, the sigqueue is dropped even if there are other tasks running within the group that could handle it. As a result posix timers with thread group wide target may miss signals when some of their threads are exiting. Fix this with verifying that the current task hasn't been through exit_notify() before proposing it as a preferred target so as to ensure that its sighand is still here and stable. complete_signal() might still reconsider the choice and find a better target within the group if current has passed retarget_shared_pending() already. Fixes: bcb7ee7 ("posix-timers: Prefer delivery of signals to the current thread") Reported-by: Anthony Mallet <anthony.mallet@laas.fr> Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241122234811.60455-1-frederic@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/26411.57288.238690.681680@gargle.gargle.HOWL (cherry picked from commit 63dffec) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
cve CVE-2026-98256 commit-author Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> commit d2710c8 commit-source-sha 621c365 commit-source linux-6.18.y upstream-diff | Conflict in exit_signals() due to missing commit: 2b1642b ("signal: Move MMCID exit out of sighand lock") however this is part of a much larger rewrite of sched/mmcid https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251119172549.706439391@linutronix.de/ Too invasive to backport. Keeping sched_mm_cid_exit_signals(tsk) at the top of the new scoped_guard() prior to tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING keep the original ordering of both the now defunct early-exit path and the locked path. [ Upstream commit d2710c8 ] Hyunwoo debugged the following KASAN UAF splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888007ed80c8 by task poc/79 ... Call Trace: __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0 do_send_sig_info+0xa7/0x160 do_send_specific+0x76/0xa0 __x64_sys_tgkill+0x193/0x270 ... Allocated by task 80: do_timer_create+0x1a4/0x1030 __x64_sys_timer_create+0x145/0x190 ... Freed by task 12: kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x1f8/0x4a0 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x14f/0x1c0 kfree_rcu_work+0x128/0x1a0 ... Last potentially related work creation: kvfree_call_rcu+0x39/0x390 __flush_itimer_signals+0x211/0x320 flush_itimer_signals+0x47/0x90 begin_new_exec+0xa6b/0x28c0 It turned out that this happens with a non-leader exec() as Hyunwoo explained: de_thread() calls exchange_tids() before release_task(leader), so the struct pid held by a SIGEV_THREAD_ID timer created against the leader's tid now points to the thread which called execve(). pid_task() returns that thread and lock_task_sighand() on it succeeds. If the timer signal is blocked, its sigqueue stays queued on the leader's task::pending. The next expiry of that timer can then run while release_task() flushes the queue. posixtimer_send_sigqueue() checks whether the sigqueue is already queued with a plain list_empty(), which only reads list_head::next. list_del_init() is not atomic and INIT_LIST_HEAD() stores list_head::next before list_head::prev, so the check can pass in between. list_add_tail() queues the entry on the task::pending of the live thread, and the list_head::prev store from the flush then overwrites the list_head::prev link that list_add_tail() has just set. __flush_itimer_signals() does not undo that either. With list_head::prev pointing at the entry itself, its list_del_init() only stores the same values again, so the entry is not removed from the list. It is still there after the last reference is dropped and the timer is freed by RCU, and the list_add_tail() of a later tgkill() follows that list_head::prev into the freed timer. This problem surfaced with the recent commit which moved the sigqueue flush out of the sighand lock held region. Hyonwoo proposed to fix this by using list_del_init_careful(), but that just papers over the problem. After some disucssions and various attempts to solve it, Eric pointed out that there is no reason to flush task::pending late in release_task() and it should be done in exit_signals() already. As nothing can collect and deliver signals which are queued in a dying task's pending queue, there is no reason to delay it further. But it has to be ensured that no signals can be queued into it after that point. exit_signals() sets PF_EXITING in task::flags, which can be used as an indicator for this. Cure it by: - Preventing signal queueing for task private signals (PIDTYPE_PID) when the task has PF_EXITING set in __send_signal_locked() and in posixtimer_send_sigqueue(). - Protecting the unlocked setting of PF_EXITING in exit_signals() for the task group empty and the group exit case with sighand lock - Flushing task::pending signals right there. Optimize that by moving the whole pending list to an on-stack list head under sighand lock and free the signals without the lock held. There has been quite some discussion about the lockless flush and the non-leader exec case on weakly ordered systems. The problem is that a third party which tries to send a posix timer signal relies on the PID lookup to find the target task and that lookup might result in the new leader when the signal was originaly directed to the old leader. In case that the signal was queued on the old leader then the lockless flush raised a concern over the following situation: old_leader new_leader third party A: flush_list() // list_del_init() stores to sigqueue LOCK (tasklist) old_leader->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE; B: UNLOCK (tasklist) C: LOCK (tasklist) if (old_leader->exit_state) transfer_tids() D: store PID posix_timer_send_sigqueue() // Observes #D so t = new_leader E: t = get_target() F: LOCK (sighand) G: if (list_empty(sigqueue)) list_add(sigqueue) The concern was that the third party might observe #D but not observe #A and therefore would proceed to #G while the list_del() stores (#A) in flush_list() are not visible yet, which could result in list corruption. That would be possible if looking at it solely from a RELEASE+ACQUIRE ordering point of view, but B-C is a UNLOCK+LOCK hand-over, which is not the same as RELEASE+ACQUIRE: RELEASE+ACQUIRE: RCpc, only the CPUs involved agree on the ordering UNLOCK+LOCK: RCtso, the hand-over is store-ordering As B-C is UNLOCK+LOCK, which is RCtso and that does impose store order, A stores must happen before the D store. Combine with E-F, which has a data dependency from the LOAD to the LOCK and thereby constraints later LOADs, those sigqueue loads in G that come after F must in fact observe the A stores. Fixes: fb3bbcf ("exit: change the release_task() paths to call flush_sigqueue() lockless") Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Debugged-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Tested-by: Kijo Park <red993688@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260911090541.572536604@kernel.org Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aok1rdkBgZsynHZB@v4bel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 621c365) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Simplifies the workflow to use the reusable workflow defined in main branch. This reduces duplication and makes the workflow easier to maintain across multiple branches. The workflow was renamed because it now includes validation over and above just checking for upstream fixes Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
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🔍 Diffofdiffs: 3 of 4 backports differ from upstreamOpen to anyone signed in to GitHub. Report expires 2027-01-12 20:19 UTC.
1 additional commit has no upstream reference and was not compared. Checked PR revision |
🔍 Diffofdiffs: 3 of 4 backports differ from upstreamOpen to anyone signed in to GitHub. Report expires 2027-01-12 20:19 UTC.
1 additional commit has no upstream reference and was not compared. Checked PR revision |
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✅ Validation checks completed successfully View full results: https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/38631847573 |
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✅ Validation checks completed successfully View full results: https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/38631852238 |
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