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[Bug Bash] Blocked egress looks like a DNS failure #3228
Seen in step 4 of the ate-env flow (ate-env alice shell 'wget -q -T 20 -O /data/zen.txt https://api.github.com/zen'), with no egress policy on the actor. That flow pins Substrate ddb46651. main (ffed855) has the same code path.
This is the designed behavior. The sandbox DNS relay answers a hostname that no egress rule allows with a synthesized NXDOMAIN (internal/atunnel/dns/dnshandler.go, "A disallowed name results in an NXDOMAIN"). docs/egress-traffic.md documents it. The problem is that a user can't tell a policy denial from a typo or a real DNS outage:
The guest sees an ordinary resolver failure.
I found no log or metric for DNS policy denials. The DNS handler only logs at debug level, when it drops a query because too many are in flight.
kubectl ate logs actor --source lifecycle and the egress gateway logs don't mention the denied name.
Possible fixes, smallest first:
Log or count denied DNS names per actor so an operator can see them, for example as a lifecycle event or an atenet-egress metric with the atespace attribute.
Add an Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914, info code 15 "Blocked" or 18 "Prohibited") to the synthesized NXDOMAIN. Resolvers that show EDE can then report a policy block. Plain NXDOMAIN behavior is unchanged.
Say in the ate-env tab and in docs/egress-traffic.md that "bad address" or "could not resolve host" for an external name usually means the actor has no egress rule for it.
Found during the GKE bug bash, with help from an AI agent.
Another use case for the per-actor part of this, which #3395's counter (no actor or atespace label) does not cover.
We run untrusted, user-written code in actors. Each call gets a fresh actor whose EgressPolicy lists only the hosts
that code declared. Our current sandbox fails the call whenever the code tried an undeclared host, even if the code
catches the network error. On Substrate the access is blocked, which is the part that matters most. But the code can
catch the NXDOMAIN and finish "successfully", and nothing records which actor looked up which name. The gateway's 403
path already logs at WARN with the actor reference (cmd/atenet/internal/router/egress/egress.go); the DNS path is
the only denial with no per-actor trace.
What would close it for us, in order of preference:
Any per-actor signal a controller can read after the actor is deleted.
Seen at 94e0a26 on kind with gVisor. Repro: a policy with one tlsPassthrough rule for example.com:443, then fetch("https://example.org/") from inside the actor → NXDOMAIN, and no log line in atelet, ateworker or
atenet-egress.
Activity
bowei commentedon Oct 27, 2026
Looks like this should be:
doc: add details on how a DNS denial from egress policy looks inside …
masavik commentedon Nov 9, 2026
Another use case for the per-actor part of this, which #3395's counter (no actor or atespace label) does not cover.
We run untrusted, user-written code in actors. Each call gets a fresh actor whose EgressPolicy lists only the hosts
that code declared. Our current sandbox fails the call whenever the code tried an undeclared host, even if the code
catches the network error. On Substrate the access is blocked, which is the part that matters most. But the code can
catch the NXDOMAIN and finish "successfully", and nothing records which actor looked up which name. The gateway's 403
path already logs at WARN with the actor reference (
cmd/atenet/internal/router/egress/egress.go); the DNS path isthe only denial with no per-actor trace.
What would close it for us, in order of preference:
follow-up Count actor DNS queries by egress policy decision #3395 mentions).
Seen at 94e0a26 on kind with gVisor. Repro: a policy with one
tlsPassthroughrule forexample.com:443, thenfetch("https://example.org/")from inside the actor → NXDOMAIN, and no log line in atelet, ateworker oratenet-egress.