[sometimesyash]

New slide uploads now generate their source paths on the server from collection, academic year, series/session number and title. The form no longer asks for a path. Existing source, metadata or PDF collisions are refused; replacements retain their URLs, notes and downloads. The API enforces the exact decoded 8 MiB limit.

The isolated website publication check now copies uploaded slide sources alongside their canonical knowledge files. This fixes the failed website check on the Multivariate Regression upload in PR #89. Its actual 22-page PDF reproduced the failure before the fix and passed the full website/MCP integration build afterwards; both GitHub checks on #89 now pass.

All private management requests also require active UCLAIS membership (stable organisation ID verified), repository write access and any configured stable-ID allowlist. The installed app has approved Members read-only access and remains restricted to UCLAIS/UCLAIS.github.io. This organisation gate is already live; branch protection is unchanged.

Validation: 373 service tests across 26 files, TypeScript and the management Worker build pass. Tests cover native Workers OAuth/redirects, session tampering/expiry, membership and write-access revocation, invalid Origin/CSRF/Bearer/content-type headers, duplicate cookies, safe generated paths, collisions and exact file-size boundaries. Source, bundle and uploaded-PDF text scans found no credentials. The current service dependency audit reports zero advisories; GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled with no alerts. The separate inherited website dependency advisory backlog remains open.

Review and approve now opens a bounded, plain-text preview with links to all changed files and submits a GitHub APPROVE review under the signed-in member’s own account. The server restricts it to open management branches in the fixed repository targeting main, refuses self-approval and stale head commits, and requires CSRF/Origin plus explicit review confirmation. It pins commit_id and never merges. Existing GitHub permissions suffice; branch rules were not changed.

The complete management runtime is deployed as Worker version 8e035c84-5cdc-4a1d-8dc9-3a3c8068221e from bdcdb2f; subsequent changes only add the security report. The live upload without a path produced the expected three files in synthetic PR #90, which was closed and its branch removed without publishing. The live review of real PR #89 loaded all four changed files and correctly disabled the author’s approval. A second real reviewer has not yet submitted an approval; success and denial paths are covered by handler/transport/native tests.

Sixteen live anonymous security boundary checks passed. Cloudflare’s binding and Fail closed setting and the GitHub App’s single-repository scope were rechecked. The security review is recorded in services/knowledge/docs/management-security-review-2026-11-05.md, including verification limits and the separate website dependency backlog. No high-confidence exploitable vulnerabilities were identified in the management paths reviewed. Content submissions still require review and merge; the management API does not expose merge or branch-rule changes.