Rekindle is pre-release software shipping to vulnerable users. Take security reports seriously; we do.
This file is the disclosure policy. For the technical security model
(encryption layers, identity, threat model), see the corresponding docs
in docs/security/.
Please do not file public issues for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, use one of the following private channels:
- GitHub private vulnerability report: open a report at https://github.com/ScopeCreep-zip/Rekindle/security/advisories/new. This is the preferred channel — GitHub will route the report to the maintainers and provide a coordinated-disclosure workspace.
- Email:
security@scopecreep.zip. PGP-encrypt sensitive details with the maintainer key (fingerprint published below; if it is missing or you cannot find a current copy, send a minimal initial mail asking for the current key and we will reply with a fresh one).
When reporting, please include:
- A description of the issue and the security impact you anticipate.
- The version, commit hash, or pre-built artifact you tested against.
- Reproduction steps. A self-contained proof-of-concept is appreciated but not required.
- Your preferred name or handle for credit (or "anonymous" if you'd rather not be named).
We will acknowledge receipt within 3 business days and aim to provide a substantive response (triage outcome, expected timeline) within 10 business days. Critical issues affecting release artifacts will be prioritized over feature work.
A current maintainer PGP key fingerprint will be published here once the project has its first signed release. Until then, GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow provides equivalent confidentiality.
Fingerprint: TBD — first published with v0.1.0 release tag
We follow coordinated disclosure norms:
- We will work with you to confirm and patch the issue.
- We will request a reasonable embargo period, typically 90 days from initial report, extendable by mutual agreement if a fix is complex.
- We will credit you in the advisory and changelog (unless you ask us not to).
- We will publish a GitHub Security Advisory when the fix ships.
If a vulnerability is being actively exploited, we will accelerate the timeline.
The following are in scope for security reports:
- Cryptographic primitives, key derivation, key storage, MEK rotation, Signal Protocol session handling.
- Veilid integration: route lifecycle, DHT record handling, gossip mesh validation.
- Privacy properties: pseudonym unlinkability across communities, metadata leakage, timing channels, traffic analysis surface.
- Authentication and authorization: invite handling, slot claims, CRDT permission validation, reader-validates enforcement.
- Memory safety in Rust crates that use
unsafe, FFI, or custom serialization. - Supply chain: dependency confusion, lockfile tampering, build script hijacking.
- The Tauri desktop app: IPC permission boundaries (capabilities), file system access, deep link handling.
- The CLI / daemon track: Noise IK IPC bus, OS keyring use, daemon privilege boundaries.
The following are out of scope:
- Reports against
legacy/artifacts. Thelegacy/directory contains reverse-engineering material from the original Xfire installer and is static reference data, not running code. - Vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies (Veilid, SQLCipher, rusqlite, Tauri) — please report those directly to the upstream project. We are happy to help coordinate.
- DoS via excessive resource use that requires an already-trusted peer
(community member with
MANAGE_*permission). Misbehavior by trusted peers is governed by the moderation system. - Issues that require physical access to an unlocked, logged-in device.
- Theoretical issues in standard primitives (Ed25519, Curve25519, AES-256-GCM, SHA-256, BLAKE3) without a concrete implementation flaw in our code.
Rekindle is pre-1.0. We do not yet maintain backports or LTS branches.
The supported version is main (and the active feature branches
listed in docs/roadmap.md).
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
Yes |
codex/communities-* (active feature branches) |
Yes |
| Anything older | No |
Once the first tagged release lands, this table will be updated to track the latest minor version with a supported window.
The architectural threat model — what we protect against, what we do not,
and what assumptions we make — lives at
docs/security/threat-model.md. Reports
that align with documented threat-model gaps are still welcome (we may
have under-estimated the risk).
Security researchers who responsibly disclose issues will be credited here once the project has its first published advisory. We do not currently run a paid bug-bounty program; that may change once Rekindle is past its first stable release.