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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

↗️ symfony/http-foundation (indirect, 7.3.0 → 7.4.21) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Symfony: ReDoS in HeaderUtils::split() Reachable Through the Cache-Control Request Header

Description

HeaderUtils::split() parsed header values with a pattern whose token alternative also matched whitespace, followed by a (?<!\s) lookbehind. A run of whitespace placed before a separator could be divided among the iterations of the enclosing repetition in exponentially many ways, and the engine tried all of them before settling. HeaderBag calls it for the Cache-Control header whenever a Request is built, so any application handling HTTP requests is reachable, with no authentication.

A single request carrying such a header costs close to a second of CPU (813 ms for a run of 17 spaces in an 8 KB header on PHP 8.5, doubling with each extra space). From 18 spaces on, preg_match_all() gives up at pcre.backtrack_limit and split() returns an empty array, so every directive of the header is silently dropped.

Resolution

The pattern now consumes whitespace only when more of the value follows it, so a value can no longer end on whitespace, nothing has to be given back, and every quantifier is possessive. The first release of this fix broke splitting on a whitespace separator: HeaderUtils::split('foo bar', ' ') returned a single value in 6.4.46 to 6.4.47, 7.4.19 to 7.4.20 and 8.1.7 to 8.1.8. Whitespace characters used as separators are now left out of the whitespace branch, which 6.4.48, 7.4.21 and 8.1.9 contain.

The patches for this issue are available here for branch 5.4 (and forward-ported to 6.4, 7.4, 8.1 and 8.2).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank r3verii for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Symfony would also like to thank Bruno Dias from Checkmarx for his help getting a CVE assigned.

🚨 Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient

Description

Symfony\Component\HttpClient\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS on 6.4+, a private constant in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:0:0/96) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), Teredo (2001::/32, RFC 4380), NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96, RFC 6052 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (::/96, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).

IpUtils::checkIp6() is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. http://[2002:7f00:1::]/ (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/ (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), http://[::7f00:1]/ (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or http://[2001::1]/ (Teredo). IpUtils::isPrivateIp() returns false and NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient dispatches the request.

Real-world reachability of the embedded IPv4 depends on the deploy's IPv6 routing (6to4 tunnel interface, upstream NAT64 gateway, kernel handling of IPv4-compatible addresses), but the security boundary the decorator promises — the dispatch decision — is crossed regardless of whether the packet ultimately lands on the embedded IPv4.

Resolution

The private-subnet list now includes ::/96, 2002::/16, 2001::/32, 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48. Blanket blocking of these prefixes matches the policy applied by Chromium and Mozilla's Private Network Access; server-side HTTPS APIs are not legitimately published on these prefixes.

The patches for this issue are available here for branch 5.4 and here for branch 6.4 (and forward-ported to 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank tonghuaroot for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

🚨 Symfony's incorrect parsing of PATH_INFO can lead to limited authorization bypass

Description

The Request class improperly interprets some PATH_INFO in a way that leads to representing some URLs with a path that doesn't start with a /. This can allow bypassing some access control rules that are built with this /-prefix assumption.

Resolution

The Request class now ensures that URL paths always start with a /.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.

Credits

We would like to thank Andrew Atkinson for discovering the issue, Chris Smith for reporting it and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

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